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armers have significantly increased their debt levels 
in recent years. Since 2004, real farm debt has risen 
nearly 5 percent annually, the fastest increase since 
the prelude to the 1980s farm debt crisis. Today’s rising 
debt raises questions about whether U.S. farm operations 
will face financial stress in the future. 
Farm financial stress can be defined as the inability 
to meet debt service payments, including principal and 
interest. The primary determinants of financial stress are 
the level of debt, its cost or interest rate, and the amount 
of farm income available to service the debt. Low interest 
rates and high income improve debt repayment, while 
higher interest rates and lower income do the opposite. 
In recent years, low interest rates and robust farm income 
have kept financial stress from spiking for the average farm 
operation. Still, some agricultural enterprises have seen 
incomes fall, leaving some producers with elevated levels 
of financial stress. 
This article examines the concentration of debt and 
farm financial stress across U.S. producers. The article 
also considers how financial stress would be affected by an 
abrupt surge in interest rates or a drop in farm income. 
If farm financial conditions were to deteriorate rapidly, 
no producer would be immune to rising financial stress. 
However, the producers most susceptible to rising stress 
would primarily be those with limited income, primarily 
among livestock producers and operators younger than 35 
years old.  
Who has farm debt?
Since 2004, farm operations have accumulated debt at a 
pace similar to that of the 1970s. Unlike the 1970s, though, 
the recent run-up in farm debt is concentrated in real estate 
and among a small group of producers. These producers vary 
relative to farm size, enterprise, and age of owner. 
The recent rise in farm debt—especially real estate 
debt—resembles the growth of debt in the 1970s. From 
1974 to 1980, total farm debt rose about 6 percent 
annually, with equal gains in both real estate and non-real 
estate debt. From 2003 to 2009, total farm debt increased 
just short of 5 percent per year. However, recent debt gains 
are more concentrated in farm real estate. From 2003 to 
2009, farm real estate debt rose more than 6 percent per 
year, compared to less than 3 percent per year for non-real 
estate debt. One reason for the larger rise in real estate 
debt is that real farmland values surged 40 percent during 
the same time period.1 
Much of today’s farm debt is also concentrated among 
fewer producers. According to the most recently available 
data, only about 30 percent of producers in 2008 reported 
                                issue vipa g e  2
repayment capacity utilization (DRCU) ratio, which 
takes into account all three determinants of stress: debt, 
income, and interest rates. Specifically, the DRCU is 
defined as outstanding farm debt divided by how much 
debt the farmer can afford to repay with net farm income 
at current interest rates.3 Thus, a DRCU of 1 indicates 
net farm income is sufficient to service outstanding debt. 
A DRCU of less than 1 reflects that income is more than 
sufficient to handle debt—and thus financial stress is low. 
For example, producers with a DRCU of 0.5 could afford 
to service twice as much farm debt. As the DRCU moves 
higher, financial stress rises. Farmers with DRCUs above 1 
would be unable to service all debt using net farm income 
alone. Farmers with DRCUs above 2 would be under 
extreme financial stress because their debt would be double 
the amount they could afford.
In 2008, most U.S. farm operators with farm debt 
had low levels of financial stress. The majority of these 
producers had a DRCU below 1. In fact, more than 40 
percent had a DRCU below 0.5, reflecting low levels 
of stress. Still, about 25 percent had a DRCU above 2, 
indicating severe financial stress.
Larger farming operations, those with $1 million or 
more in sales, typically had low levels of financial stress. More 
than 75 percent of large farming operations carrying debt 
had DRCUs below 0.5, and less than 5 percent had DRCUs 
above 2 (Chart 2). Although larger farming operations often 
  farm debt.2 In contrast, soon after the 1980s 
farm debt crisis, more than 60 percent of 
producers still had some debt.
The recent rise in debt has been 
concentrated among large farming operations 
with more than $1 million in sales. From 2004 
to 2008, total real farm debt, as measured 
in constant 2005 dollars, doubled for large 
farming operations, rising to $60 billion 
(Chart 1). These large farms, which accounted 
for 5 percent of all farms, saw their share of 
total farm debt rise from 15 to 30 percent. 
In contrast, the total amount of debt held by 
smaller farm operations (sales of less than $1 
million) held steady at roughly $160 billion, 
while their share of farm debt dropped from 
85 to 70 percent. 
Rising debt has also varied by producer 
type. From 2004 to 2008, as the price of farmland reached 
historical highs, total farm debt held by crop producers 
jumped 30 percent, and real estate debt surged more than 
35 percent. By 2008, crop producers held about half of 
total farm debt. In contrast, from 2004 to 2008 the other 
half of U.S. farm debt, held by livestock producers, rose just 
5 percent. 
Finally, debt levels have also varied by the age of farm 
owners. While young farmers (under the age of 35) only 
held about 10 percent of farm debt in 2008, their debt 
levels have risen sharply. From 2004 to 2008, their farm 
debt rose 40 percent, with much of the rise related to the 
significant capital investments necessary to begin farming. 
Farm financial stress 
Farm financial stress arises when producers lack 
sufficient income to service their debt at current interest 
rates. Since 2004, the farm sector has enjoyed some 
banner profits, with real net farm income exceeding the 
historical average by more than 7 percent. Profits have 
been highly variable, though, with most accruing to large 
farming operations. Thus, large operations had ample 
income to service their sizable debt loads. On the other 
hand, livestock producers and operators younger than 
35 have missed out on these stronger profits, creating 
financial stress for many of them.
Farm financial stress can be measured using a debt 
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  Operator younger than 35 Years Old carry substantial debt loads, their ample incomes are 10 times 
the average income for all producers carrying debt, allowing 
them to service their debt.
The majority of crop producers with farm debt were 
also able to service their debt. Surging commodity prices 
in 2008 boosted crop incomes about 20 percent. Despite 
a sharp rise in their debt loads, nearly 70 percent 
of crop producers carrying debt had a DRCU of 
less than 1. Still, roughly 20 percent had a DRCU 
above 2. 
In contrast, livestock producers’ financial 
stress rose significantly with falling net incomes. 
In 2008, weak livestock prices and rising feed costs 
contributed to declining net incomes of livestock 
producers. As a result, nearly a third of all livestock 
producers faced severe financial stress, with 
DRCUs rising above 2. 
Young farmers also suffered mounting levels 
of financial stress due to falling incomes in 2008. 
Nearly a third of all young farmers had a DRCU 
greater than 2. Many young farmers fell into this 
severely stressed category because from 2007 to 2008 
their average net farm income declined 12 percent. 
How vulnerable are producers to 
financial shocks?
While some producers are more financially 
stressed than others, none are immune to the 
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Chart 2 
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Chart 3 
eFFeCt interest rates rising to 8.5 perCent on  
repayment CapaCity utilization (drCu) ratio ranges
Source. 2008 ARMS data on farm debt and net farm income
prospects of rising stress. Elevated financial 
stress could result from higher interest rates 
or falling net incomes. This section analyzes 
how a set of financial shocks—an abrupt 
surge in interest rates, a sharp decline in 
income, or a combination of both—would 
affect the level of financial stress among 
agricultural producers.4  
Rising interest rates would strain the 
ability of farmers to service their debt. 
Currently, farm interest rates are at historical 
lows, averaging 6.5 percent across operating 
and real estate debt and thus limiting farm 
financial stress.5 But if interest rates were to 
suddenly return to their 2007 average of 8.5 
percent, how high would financial stress rise?  
Large farms (sales of more than $1 million) would 
experience little additional financial stress from the two-
percentage-point rise in interest rates (Chart 3). The 
percentage of large farms with DRCUs above 1 would rise 
from 10 to 11 percent. The ample farm incomes of large 
farms would be more than enough to cover the increased 
interest cost. 
Similarly, an interest rate hike to 8.5 percent would 
have a limited effect on livestock producers with debt. The 
number of livestock producers with DRCUs above 1 would 
rise from 49 to 52 percent. Little movement would occur 
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due in part to the months of losses and rising debt levels 
that have already put so many livestock producers into the 
high-stress categories. 
Young operators, however, could feel greater financial 
stress in the event of an interest rate shock. The percentage 
of young operators with DRCUs exceeding 1 would rise 
from 50 to 55 percent. Their sensitivity to rising interest 
rates is likely due to their lower incomes. On average, 
young operators’ income was one-third less than the 
average income of all producers with debt.
Declining farm incomes might also exacerbate financial 
stress. It is not unusual for annual net farm income to 
plunge 30 percent as it did in 2002, 2006, and 2009. 
Applying a one-year, 30 percent drop in income across 
today’s producers indicates livestock producers and young 
farmers would be more likely to move into the highest-
stressed category (Chart 4).
Few large farms would become highly stressed by 
severe income loss, the percentage of livestock producers 
with DRCUs above 1 would rise from 49 to 59 percent. 
The number of livestock producers under extreme 
financial stress (a DRCU above 2) would increase from 32 
to 39 percent. 
Young farmers are also susceptible to rising financial 
stress from falling farm incomes. With a 30 percent decline 
in farm incomes, the number of young farmers facing 
a DRCU above 1 would rise from 50 to 62 percent. Of 
these producers, nearly half could see their DRCU exceed 
2. Young farmers are more sensitive to falling incomes 
because their average income is well below the average of 
all farmers. 
A combination of sharply higher interest rates and a 
steep income decline would lead to greater impacts on 
farm financial stress. The last such period occurred in the 
1980s, when farm interest rates doubled from 1976 to 
1981, reaching a peak of 18 percent in 
1981, and farm incomes declined by 30 
percent. 
Under this scenario, the number of 
financially stressed farms would jump 
significantly. The percentage of large 
farming operations facing DRCUs greater 
than 1 would more than double, rising 
from 10 to 24 percent (Chart 5). Yet, 
the greatest stresses would emerge for 
livestock producers and young operators 
—farming operations with the weakest 
net farm incomes. Under record-high 
interest rates and sharply falling incomes, 
the number of livestock producers with 
DRCUs above 1 would soar from 49 to 
67 percent, and the number of young 
operators with DRCUs above 1 would rise from 50 to 65 
percent.
Moreover, this acute financial shock would lead to a 
steep rise in the percentage of farms under severe stress. 
The number of severely stressed large farmers—those 
with DRCUs greater than 2—would nearly triple, rising 
from 4 to 11 percent. Livestock producers and young 
farmers would again experience the most severe financial 
stress because their weak net farm incomes would not be 
Chart 4 
eFFeCt oF Farm inComes Falling 30 perCent on deBt 
repayment CapaCity utilization (drCu) ratio ranges
falling incomes. A 30 percent drop in farm income would 
push the percentage of large farms with DRCUs above 1 
from 10 to 15 percent. Again, higher farm incomes give 
most large farmers a debt repayment margin to weather 
such a drop in farm income. 
Falling incomes alone could significantly increase 
financial stress for many livestock producers. Following a 
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Chart 5 
eFFeCt oF Farm inComes Falling 30 perCent and interest 
rates rising to 18 perCent on deBt repayment CapaCity 
utilization (drCu) ratio ranges
enough to absorb the shock. The percentage of producers 
with DRCUs above 2 would rise from 32 to 51 percent 
for livestock producers and from 35 to 51 percent for 
young operators.6 
Conclusions  
Over the past year, historically low interest rates and 
rising incomes have allowed farmers to service elevated 
debt levels that are concentrated among a few farm types. 
This analysis shows, however, that a financial shock—an 
increase in farm interest rates, a decline in farm income, 
or both—could increase financial stress quickly, especially 
among livestock producers and young operators. A surge 
in financial stress among livestock producers, who hold 
half of all farm debt, would be of particular concern to 
agricultural lenders. 
endnotes
1Calculation based on National Agricultural Statistics Service 
land survey.
2Calculations based on the most recent Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data (2008), 
which is available from the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service and 
the Economic Research Service.
3This analysis uses the most recent 2008 Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to calculate individual 
farm DRCUs, assuming an interest rate of 6.5 percent. The 
following assumptions and calculations are taken from the 
Economic Research Service of the USDA and can be found 
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/farmincome/glossary/def_
drcu.htm. Key assumptions are the maximum loan payment 
is based on a minimum debt service coverage ratio of 1.25, 
the average non-real estate interest rate is assumed to be 6.5 
percent, and the repayment term is 7 years. 
4The analysis only considers the effect of a one-period shock 
on the DRCU. A shock lasting for multiple periods was 
not analyzed.
5All interest rates are based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City’s Survey of Agricultural Credit Conditions.
6This analysis only explores the impact of a one-year interest rate 
and income shock. A sustained period of record-high interest 
rates and low farm incomes would be expected to have a 
greater impact on farm financial stress for all producers.







Baseline  Farm Income and 
Interest Rate Shock 
Baseline  Farm Income and 
Interest Rate Shock 
Baseline  Farm Income and 



























DRCU 1 to 2 (High Stress)  DRCU Greater than 2 (Highest Stress) 
Operator less than
35 Years old
Farms with Sales 
Greater than $1 Million 
Livestock Producers 